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Instructors: Christopher Fichtlscherer; Dr. Moritz Kütt
Event type:
Seminar
Displayed in timetable as:
96-5.01
Credits:
6,0
Language of instruction:
German/English
Min. | Max. participants:
6 | 20
Waiting list:
Waiting list quota: 20%
More information:
This course is open to all students of the Master's programme "Peace and Security Studies" (regardless of whether they are enrolled in the one-year or two-year version).
The course is also open to students of other degree programmes. The prerequisite for participation in the course is attendance at the first session. In case of non-attendance, the place will be forfeited and will be made available for latecomers.
Comments/contents:
Almost all international treaties and agreements on the control and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction contain verification mechanisms. These mechanisms are primarily based on technical procedures designed to generate, support, or even replace political confidence in treaty compliance. In the seminar, we will develop a broad overview of these technologies and analyze the relationship between verification methods and political decisions. The substantive focus will be on nuclear weapons regulation and related global treaties, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. We want to examine various verification technologies and use the fictitious example of nuclear disarmament in Great Britain to better understand their possible applications, strengths, and weaknesses. In doing so, we will also address the questions of which verification procedures are suitable for which treaties, which gaps and deception possibilities verification technologies allow, and how to deal with detected (apparent) fraud attempts.
Learning objectives:
Students will get a broad overview of different verification methods. Historical examples are considered, currently used technologies are discussed, and a look at technical developments is taken. The latter could enable entirely new possibilities of verification. Students work their way into these technologies in detail and gain an understanding of the technological possibilities and limitations. Through critical discussions and a fictitious use case, we will highlight strengths and weaknesses and understand the relationship between technology use and political decision-making in the context of (nuclear) disarmament and arms control treaties.
Didactic concept:
Literature study, discussions in class, student presentations, written seminar papers
Literature:
Krass, Allan S. Verification: How Much Is Enough? London: Taylor & Francis, 1985.
Woolf, Amy F. “The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions,” U.S. Congressional Research Services. 2019.
Feiveson, H.A., Glaser, A., Mian, Z. and Von Hippel, F.N., 2014. Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation. MIT Press.
Heinonen, Olli. “Verifying the Dismantlement of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program”, Strategic Studies Institute, 2014.
Glaser, Alexander, and Irmgard Niemeyer. “Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Without Onsite Access,” Toward Nuclear Disarmament Building up Transparency and Verification, 2021
Additional examination information:
Active participation, presentations by students and written seminar papers. Students will receive
their seminar certificate by giving presentations and written seminar papers.
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