Lehrende: Dr. Leonie Gerhards
Veranstaltungsart: Interaktive Lehrveranstaltung
Anzeige im Stundenplan:
Semesterwochenstunden: 3
Credits: 6,0
Unterrichtssprache: Englisch
Min. | Max. Teilnehmerzahl: - | 45
Kommentare/ Inhalte: The goal of this course is to give you a thorough introduction to the field of organizational economics. For this purpose, we will discuss recent theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers contributing to the field. The course is organized around the following topics (subject to smaller changes): 1. Introduction: Do Incentives Work? A Primer on Incentive Theory. A Primer on Evidence from the Lab and the Field. 2. Behavioral Contracting 3. Matching of Workers to Firms 4. Persistent Productivity Differences – What Do Managers Do? 5. Learning about Organizations through Field Experiments 6. Authority and Leadership 7. Organizational Economics of the Public Sector
Lernziel: By the end of the course, when you come across an empirical observation or an informal argument about organizations, you should be able to sketch a model trying to make sense of it or to develop an idea to test a conjecture.
Literatur: We will be building on master level knowledge in microeconomics and econometrics. That is, basic knowledge of principal-agent theory and game theory will be helpful. To brush up your knowledge in microeconomics, you can consult: Geoffrey A. Jehle and Philip J. Reny: “Advanced Microeconomic Theory”; Prentice Hall; 3rd edition; 2011 To brush up your econometric knowledge, you can consult: Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke: “Mostly Harmless Econometrics”; Princeton University Press; 1st edition; 2008 A recent comprehensive overview of work in the field of organizational economics is provided by: Robert Gibbons (Editor), John Roberts (Editor) (2012) “The Handbook of Organizational Economics,” Princeton University Press.
